

not always easy, and the creation of an elaborate code system to maintain communication among one another to alleviate the stress of long periods of solitary confinement.

This is an outstanding piece of scholarship. Although an in-house study sponsored by the Department of Defense, it achieves the highest standards of balanced scholarship and objectivity, meticulous research, logical organization, and clear writing.

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*From Pearl Harbor to Saigon: Japanese American Soldiers and the Vietnam War.* By Toshio Whelchel. (New York: Verso, 1999. xx, 203 pp. \$25.00, ISBN 1-85984-859-1.)

Twenty-five years have passed, and the agony of the Vietnam War continues to haunt the memories of many of those who fought it. Toshio Whelchel opens the door for us on the lives of eleven enlisted men who participated in that tragic enterprise. The narrators represent a select sample drawn from a pool of fifty-nine Asian American Vietnam veterans who were interviewed by the author as part of a 1995 study. The "in country" tours of the eleven cover the period 1965 to 1971 and include the experiences of three former United States Marines who volunteered to avoid the draft or were compelled to enlist as a direct result of court orders. The remaining eight are former army volunteers and draftees. The author's central themes include his belief that this was a war fought primarily by working-class youth, that the residual impact of the World War II exile and incarceration of Americans of Japanese ancestry played a major role in the Vietnam experiences of Japanese American servicemen, and that, because of a history of anti-Asian racism, they were viewed differently by many of their military peers—they looked like the enemy.

Without question the most valuable contributions of this work are found in the chronicles of the eleven veterans. Whelchel's narrators relate experiences that complement those found in Charley Trujillo's edited collection *Soldados: Chicanos in Viet Nam* (1990) and stand in stark contrast to the visions of senior offic-

ers described in such works as William Westmoreland's *A Soldier Reports* (1976) and Bruce Palmer's *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (1984). This is particularly true in regard to the use of drugs, alcohol, and other controlled substances by the troops.

The work, however, is not without some vexing problems. Whelchel relates that his respondents represent a demographic cross section of young Japanese American Vietnam veterans from the greater Los Angeles area, yet he presents no evidence to support this broad contention. In a work dealing with military subjects one does not expect to deal with the misidentification of major units such as the 173rd Airborne Brigade being called a division. Later, as Lawrence Yoshida discusses his advanced individual training, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is badly misspelled, raising the question of whether the narrators were asked to review the transcripts of their interviews prior to publication.

Vexations aside, Whelchel has provided a vehicle for eleven powerful narratives on the Vietnam experience. While these accounts show that Japanese American soldiers and marines were assigned to units that were racially integrated, they, unlike their peers, faced not only the rigors of a combat environment but also inevitably the added stress of dealing on a daily and personal level with the results of over a hundred years of accumulated American anti-Asian sentiment.

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*United States Foreign Policy towards Cambodia, 1977-92: A Question of Realities.* By Christopher Brady. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. xxvi, 227 pp. \$65.00, ISBN 0-312-22021-9.)

This book is an examination of United States foreign policy toward Cambodia during the Vietnamese occupation of that country. Christopher Brady bases his study on the idea that each administration had a mind-set—the word he uses is "reality"—that shaped its basic approach to world affairs. His main source material in determining those realities is the public statements and speeches of administration officials.

Brady brings a foreign perspective in both expertise and nationality to this topic. He is a former Royal Navy officer and is currently a lecturer in decision-making theory at City University Business School, London. He has previously written books on the British cabinet and has no expertise on either Cambodia or United States foreign policy. As a result, he is interested in exploring issues that historians usually do not explore and sees some issues quite differently from the way previous writers do. He faults Jimmy Carter for having no strategic vision rather than for being indecisive, which is the more popular take on that president. He credits Ronald Reagan with greater administrative strength than is commonly assumed and sees the administration's foreign policy team as being more cohesive than was thought at the time and since. Brady, however, began this study thinking Cambodia would have been a far more important topic to Americans than it was, a mistake that a specialist in United States foreign policy most likely would not have made.

There are a number of strengths and weaknesses to this book. The most important strength is that this work is essentially the first draft of a history, and Brady has done a good job of writing about the emotionally charged issue of Cambodia with professional detachment. He has done impressive work in figuring out the political and bureaucratic structure of a foreign government and incorporates Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Chinese voices into his account. He has also included a useful chronology. On the other hand, Brady uses the passive voice far too frequently, and his use of acronyms is just plain confusing. Although there is a list of abbreviations at the front of the book, some of the terms found in the text are absent. More significant, the idea that public statements do indeed represent a genuine foreign policy mind-set is difficult to accept. There are too many examples of an administration, including the ones in this study, saying one thing and doing another. Public statements are often made for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is deception.

In conclusion, experts will find this study of some interest and use. Librarians should add this work to their collections. This is the type of book that undergraduates will be able to read for a review assignment, but it is difficult

to see it working well as a mandatory classroom text or having any appeal to the general public.

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1968: *Los archivos de la violencia* (1968: The archives of violence). By Sergio Aguayo Quezada. (Mexico City: Reforma, 1998. 331 pp. Paper, ISBN 970-05-1026-3.) In Spanish.

More than thirty years have passed since the massacre at Tlatelolco in the fall of 1968 transformed Mexican society and politics, yet "we still do not know exactly what happened" that day. Despite that note of admission, this book brings us closer than any other in shedding light on crucial questions surrounding the massacre while helping to clarify other unanswered questions that remain. Information from previously classified Mexican government documents would alone make this book significant, but Sergio Aguayo Quezada goes much further (with the help, as he points out, of a bevy of research assistants), incorporating declassified United States documents and the papers of Avery Brundage (International Olympic Committee chairman), providing a review of the international press, and conducting numerous interviews. Out of this global methodological approach emerges an equally challenging reinterpretation of Mexican authoritarianism in the 1960s.

Aguayo argues that government repression of the student movement in 1968 evolved out of a successful strategy of containment employed against numerous other dissident movements during the previous decade; 1968 "should be seen as a link in the long and little known history of the evolution of political violence in Mexico." The methods of control included an extensive intelligence apparatus (involving the tapping of phones, opening of mail, and use of *agents provocateurs*), the routinization of violence (with army, police, and paramilitary forces all playing a direct role), and the subordination of the mass media to government objectives. Indeed, the first part of the book is dedicated to providing direct evidence for the "burly, disciplined, and effective machine" that was the state's security apparatus as it evolved during the 1960s. Although critically